Abstract. The congestion control algorithm in TCP relies on correct feedback from the receiver to determine the rate at which packets should be sent into the network. Hence, correct receiver feedback (in the form of acknowledgements in TCP) is essential to the goal of sharing the scarce bandwidth resources fairly and avoiding congestion collapse in the Internet. However, the assumption that a TCP receiver can always be trusted (to generate feedback correctly) no longer holds as there are plenty of incentives for a receiver to deviate from the protocol. In fact, it has been shown that a misbehaving receiver (whose aim is to bring about congestion collapse) can easily generate acknowledgements to conceal loss and drive a number of honest, innocent senders arbitrary fast to create a significant number of non-responsive packet flows leading to denial of service to other Internet users. We give two efficient, provably secure mechanisms to force a receiver to generate feedback correctly; any incorrect acknowledgement will be detected at the sender. The first scheme is based on an ideal cryptographic hash, and the second one on aggregate authenticators. We also show variants of the second scheme which can (partially) solve the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks, which is not achievable previously.
Introduction
The congestion control algorithm [16] of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol [22] ) is an essential component contributing to the stability of the current Internet. It allows fair sharing of the scarce bandwidth resources and avoids congestion collapse in the Internet. However, it has been found vulnerable to incorrect feedback from a misbehaving receiver by Savage et. al. [25] and subsequently by Sherwood et. al. [26] . More specifically, when a misbehaving TCP receiver generates optimistic acknowledgements (acknowledging the receipt of TCP segments which have not been received), the sender of the TCP session could be deceived into believing a fast connection is available and injects more packets into the network (through increasing its TCP flow window and sending new packets) despite that the acknowledged TCP segments may have been lost in a heavily congested network. Note that the stability of the Internet relies on TCP senders to back off their traffic when congestion occurs as inferred by packet loss [16, 11] .
The TCP congestion control algorithm [16, 22, 2] was designed based on the assumption that a TCP receiver can always be trusted [9] and all his feedback in the form of acknowledgements [1] for correctly received packets is a reliable source of information about the traffic/congestion condition in the network. When network congestion occurs at some routers in the network, packet dropping starts to occur at the input queues of the congested routers. The design of TCP congestion control algorithm considers packet loss as the onset of congestion somewhere in the network [16, 22, 2, 11] . The TCP sender thus slows down its rate of injecting packets into the network (through multiplicatively reducing its TCP flow window and slightly inflating its timeout timer) with a view to relieving the congestion condition. However, the information of packet loss is usually provided by the receiver in the form of acknowledgements [1] . When this information is false, the TCP sender may respond to a network congestion in the oppositive direction leading to non-responsive traffic flows which cause other honest TCP users to back off their traffic. These non-responsive flows, in essence, form a type of denial of service attacks, as first identified by Floyd et. al. [11] and subsequently illustrated by Sherwood et. al. [26] . The effect of such non-responsive flows can easily be multiplied by a deliberate attacker using a small TCP segment size [24] . More seriously, subtle attackers can exploit this vulnerability of TCP to bring down the operation of the Internet by pumping in an enormous amount of traffic through a distributed network of malicious TCP receivers. In fact, Sherwood et. al. has shown the possibility of bringing terribly extensive network congestion over a prolonged period using such an attack [26] . Puzzle-based defence [28] could possibly limit the rate at which a single server/sender injects traffic into the network; but this still cannot restrict a malicious TCP receiver from attracting traffic. Note that a TCP receiver can acknowledge a whole window of segments using just a single acknowledgement. A clever attacker can open many TCP sessions with different servers, requesting large files; while each of these servers may only sends data at moderate rates, all these flows converge toward the attacker and the resulting traffic aggregate (from all the servers) could be large and overwhelm several en-route routers close to the attacker. The non-responsive nature of these flows can make the congestion situation equally bad.
Despite the serious impact which could be brought about by an attacker-manipulated set of misbehaving TCP receivers (whose goal is not merely to obtain faster downloads but instead to exploit this TCP vulnerability to mount a distributed denial of service attack against the entire Internet), there lacks a rigorous study and modeling of the security goal against malicious TCP receivers. As a consequence, it is fair to say the effectiveness of the existing solutions [25, 26] remains uncertain. While most of the existing solutions emphasize backward-compatibility (as the most desired property), we adopt a cleanslate approach in this paper with provably secure solutions. For a detailed explanation of the rationale and importance of adopting a clean-slate approach to secure the Internet, [6] provides a good reference. All the solutions proposed in this paper are provably secure [18] in the sense that any breach of security found in the proposed solutions can be traced back to a vulnerability in the underlying primitive (which is widely assumed to be secure), meaning the insecurity of the latter is the only cause for the insecurity of the former. However, our solutions require modifications on both TCP senders and receivers. Nevertheless, no modification to the core functionality of the congestion control algorithm of TCP is made in our solutions; changes (in our solutions) will only be incorporated into codes for handling TCP acknowledgements and session management specified in RFC 793 [22] .
We address the security problem caused by a misbehaving TCP receiver using an approach which forces the TCP receiver to prove the receipt of segments based on cryptographic tools. We call the protocol a verifiable segment receipt (VSR) protocol. In a VSR protocol, a TCP receiver has to generate some proof to convince the sender that all the packets he claims to have received are actually received. The proof is constructed from the received segments and the attached tags generated by the sender. When a misbehaving TCP receiver wants to lie about the receipt of a certain TCP segment he has actually not received, he will not be able to create (without the knowledge of the lost segment and its tag) a valid VSR proof (acceptable by the sender) even though he may possess the data being transferred (through a prior download) 1 ; in other words, a malicious TCP receiver cannot launch a playback attack, namely, he cannot generate a valid VSR proof for a lost segment in the current session even though he has complete knowledge of the payload of that segment. All forged proofs (for segments not received) will be caught by the sender which can then terminate the associated TCP connection. We propose two VSR protocols, one based on a cryptographic hash function and the other based on an (additive) aggregate authenticator [7] . These two protocol are provably secure based on two different sets of assumptions: the first one is secure assuming the underlying cryptographic hash function behaves like a random function whereas the security of the second one is based on the indistinguishability property of a pseudorandom function [14] .
It should be emphasized that the VSR protocol addresses a problem different from that of remote integrity check [8] or proof of retrievability [17, 3] . Solutions of those problems cannot be applied directly to solve the problem of misbehaving TCP receivers; neither can VSR solve those problems. There are two subtle differences. First, VSR has to guard against playback attacks in which the attacker possesses the data being transferred; while a prover in possession of the stored file can definitely produce a valid proof in the proof of retrievability scheme. Second, a receiver only needs to generate a proof once (in the current session) for each piece of data received in VSR 2 whereas several executions of the verification protocol for the same piece of data in a proof of retrievability scheme are expected.
We also address the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks in this paper. As discussed in [25] , a man-in-the-middle attack in the context of misbehaving TCP receivers is difficult to guard against. In a man-in-the-middle attack, a malicious TCP receiver install some agents close to the sender. These agents may even reside in the same local network of the sender. These agents can process eavesdropped TCP segments and the attached tags, and sends the receiver a concise data structure which allows him to generate valid acknowledgements to pass the verification at the sender. These agents might even acknowledge the receipt of segments on behalf of the actual receiver. Since these agents are close to the sender, they normally receive TCP segments with a much shorter delay than the actual receiver does, thus easily giving the sender a false impression that a fast connection is available. We propose two solutions to (partially) solve the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks based on two different intuitions. In the first solution, we assume that there exists some trusted network entity geographically close to the receiver; this entity could be the firewall or network gateway of the local autonomous system wherein the receiver resides; this trusted network entity needs to pre-process VSR tags using a secret key shared with the sender in order to allow a receiver to generate valid proofs. In the second solution, we assume that each receiver is associated with a pair of public-private keys which the sender can verify; the receiver's private key is necessary for the generation of a correct VSR proof and is needed in the processing of each TCP segment; the agents are thus helpful to an attacker only when they are given the attacker's private key, which may be risky to the attacker since successful agent detection would completely reveal his private key; we hope this would hinder the attacker from using a man-in-the-middle attack.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are three-fold: (1) A formal treatment to the security problem of malicious TCP receivers is given; (2) two provably-secure protocols to solve the problem are proposed and the proposed protocols are reasonably efficient to be incorporated into the TCP protocol; (3) two solutions are proposed to (partially) solve the man-in-the-middle attack problem in which the misbehaving TCP receiver has some agents installed close to the sender to help it deceive the sender; to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide solutions to the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks in the context of misbehaving TCP receivers.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A formal security model, along with possible security notions for VSR, is given in Section 2. Section 3 presents the two VSR protocols proposed and section 4 shows two variants of the VSR protocol given in section 3.2 which defend against the man-in-the-middle attacks.
Security Model for Verifiable Segment Receipt (VSR) Protocol
Recall that our defence against a misbehaving TCP receiver is based on the idea requiring a TCP receiver to prove to a sender that it has received all the TCP segments it claims. We call this protocol a Verifiable Segment Receipt (VSR) protocol. More specifically, the TCP sender attaches some information as tags to segments sent whereby the TCP receiver can construct a proof from the segments and the corresponding tags received; the proof is then returned as part of the TCP acknowledgement for the sender to verify; in a properly designed scheme, a misbehaving receiver (which claims the receipt of segments it actually has not received) can only pass the sender's verification with negligibly small probability.
For the sake of clarity, we defer the discussions on man-in-the-middle attacks and the proposed defence mechanisms to Section 4.
Definitions
A VSR protocol consists of one sender S and one receiver R. Suppose the victim (sender S) has a universal set F of files, each with a unique file identifier f id ∈ {0, 1} * . Let M ∈ {0, 1} * be the content of the file to be transferred from S to R. Suppose S and R have agreed on a default segment size in the initial TCP handshake of a usual TCP connection (as specified in RFC 793 [22] ) such that the file content M is divided to fill n equally-sized segments s i ∈ {0, 1} * indexed by i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each s i consists of a 40-byte TCP header h i and an l-byte message payload m i , that is, s i = h i ||m i (where || denotes concatenation). Note that the sequence number of the TCP segment s i is (i − 1) · l + ISN + of f set where ISN is the initial sequence number of a TCP connection and of f set accounts for the bytes used in connection initiation. What we actually demonstrate is that segment indices (used in this paper) and sequence numbers in a normal TCP connection are interchangeably convertible to each other; we will stick to using segment indices in the discussion of this paper. Without loss of generality, assume M = m 1 || · · · ||m i || · · · ||m n . 3 A VSR protocol consists of the following algorithms.
Setup (setup)
. setup(1 λ ) → param takes the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters param (such as the hash function and its size) used in the VSR protocol. Key Generation (KG). Let KG(1 λ , param, n) → sk be a probabilistic algorithm which generates the secret key sk. Note that in some VSR protocols (such as the hash-based protocol in Section 3.1), a secret key may not be needed and KG will not be invoked. Tag Generation (TG). TG(param, sk, i, s i ) → t i is a probabilistic algorithm taking a TCP segment s i (with its index i) and the sender secret key sk to generate a tag t i appended to s i . That is, (s i , t i ) is sent to the receiver R and the actual TCP segment sent is of the form s i ||t i . Note that sk is included in the definition of TG for generality to cover both cases: schemes using a secret key and schemes using no secret key. In schemes wherein a secret key is not used, t i merely is a random string; whereas, t i includes a random string and a keyed authenticator in schemes using a secret key.
Proof Generation (PG). Let
is a deterministic algorithm used by the receiver R to generate a proof p(I) to convince the sender S that all TCP segments in S(I) have been received. (I, p(I)) is returned along with the TCP acknowledgement to the S. PG and p(I) are so defined based on I for the sake of generality such that both normal TCP (with cumulative acknowledgements [22] ) and TCP-SACK (selective acknowledgement option [19] ) are covered. For TCP with cumulative acknowledgements [22] , each I is of the form {1, 2, ..., r} where r is the index of the last in-sequence segment received correctly. Proof Verification (PV). PV(param, I, T (I), p(I)) → 0/1 is a deterministic algorithm to check the correctness of the proof p(I). If correct, 1 is returned, meaning all segments in I has been received by the prover/receiver R. Note that the set of tags T (I) may or may not be needed in some constructions; for instance, the hash based protocol in Section 3.1 needs tags as input to the verification algorithm while the aggregate authenticator based protocol in Section 3.2 does not need tags for proof verification.
Since param is public and part of the input to all algorithms in a VSR protocol, we will not explicitly write it as algorithm input in this paper.
Security Notions
As a basic requirement, a VSR protocol needs to satisfy the correctness property stated as follows.
Correctness. For all files with content M ∈ {0, 1} * , all choices of secret key sk, and all I ⊆ [0, n], if s i is a valid and correctly indexed segment from M and t i ← TG(sk, i, s i ) for all i ∈ I, then PV(I, T (I), PG(I, S(I), T (I))) = 1.
We have three notions for the security (or soundness) of a VSR protocol, the first one (security against known file content and tag access attacks) being the strongest notion but might not be achievable. The second one (security against known file content only attacks) could be the default one which reasonably fits real world scenarios.
Four types of oracle queries (adversary interaction with the system) are allowed in the security model, namely, the playback oracle O P B , the segment query oracle O SQ , the tag access oracle O T A and the proof verification oracle O P V . Their details are as follows:
On input a playback oracle query f id, l , the playback oracle retrieves the file with identifier f id and content M ∈ {0, 1} * and breaks down M into l-byte units to fill a number of (say n) segments s i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n; the TCP headers are determined by emulating the initiation of a new TCP session. The playback oracle then generates the secret key sk by running KG and computes tags t i = TG(sk, i, s i ) for all i ∈ [1, n], and replies with {(s i , t i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Segment Query Oracle O SQ (i). For a current and established TCP session (with fixed default segment size l and fixed total number n of segments for a file with identifier f id and content M ), for fixed secret key and segment decomposition, on input a segment query i (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the segment query oracle retrieves the segment s i and the secret key sk and runs the tag generation algorithm TG to generate the tag t i = TG(sk, i, s i ) and sends (s i , t i ) as the reply. Tag Access Oracle O T A (i). For a current and established TCP session (with fixed default segment size l and fixed total number n of segments for a file with identifier f id and content M ), for fixed secret key and segment decomposition, on input a tag access oracle query i (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the tag access oracle retrieves the segment s i and the secret key sk and runs the tag generation algorithm TG to generate the tag and sends the result TG(sk, i, s i ) as the reply. Proof Verification Oracle O P V (I, p(I)). For a current and established TCP session (with fixed default segment size l and fixed total number n of segments for a file with identifier f id and content M ), for fixed secret key and segment decomposition, on input a proof verification oracle query I, p(I) (where I ⊆ [1, n]), the proof verification oracle runs PV and relays the result (0 or 1) back.
Normally, the playback oracle is accessed by an adversary before launching the actual attack session while the segment query and tag access oracles are usually accessed in the actual attack session. The playback oracle is to model the scenario that an adversary first accesses victim websites (by honestly following the TCP congestion control algorithm and sending back correct feedback) to learn their behavior and obtain a number of large files (along with the used TCP headers and VSR tags) and stores this information as references for launching the subsequent actual attack. We believe the playback attack would be a real threat in misbehaving TCP receiver attacks.
The difference between the segment query oracle and the tag access oracle is in the reply content: an adversary can only obtain a tag along with the corresponding segment in a segment query, whereas, an adversary can obtain (via some unknown means such as a man-in-the-middle attack) just the tag (without a segment) of a lost TCP segment in a tag access query.
Recall that the goal of a VSR protocol is to ensure that a TCP receiver cannot deceive a TCP sender into believing that it has received a TCP segment which is actually lost in the network. The segment query oracle models the usual networking environment in which a TCP receiver would receive most of the transmitted TCP segments (and their VSR tags) while a small portion of them may be dropped at the input queues of congested routers enroute; the replies of the segment query oracle represent received TCP segments along with their VSR tags in a normal operating scenario. In the normal situation, it is implicitly assumed that the tags for all lost segments will not be accessible to a TCP receiver; this assumption could be reasonable since when a TCP segment (more precisely, an IP datagram) is dropped at a congested router, there is no way for a TCP receiver to learn the tag of that TCP segment which has never arrived at the receiver unless there is some out-of-band channel accessible to the receiver. 4 Nevertheless, for completeness, in our model, we include a tag access oracle to provide tags of lost segments for an adversary. Note that the tag access oracle can be treated as some form of man-in-themiddle attacks in narrow sense. The middle man in a man-in-the-middle attack could perform various computation on a set of captured TCP segments and their VSR tags and pass the result of computation to the attacker while a tag access oracle only detaches the tag from a captured TCP segment and passes the tag to the attacker.
Security against Known File Content and Tag Access Attacks (KFC-TA-secure).
To define VSR security against know file content and tag access attacks (KFC-TA attacks), we use the following game played between a challenger and an adversary. If no PPT (Probabilistic, Polynomial Time) adversary can win the game with non-negligible advantage (as defined below), we say the VSR protocol is KFC-TAsecure.
Definition 1. A VSR protocol is secure against known file content and tag access attacks (i.e. KFC-TAsecure) if the advantage of winning the following game is negligible in the security parameter λ for all P P T adversaries.
Setup. The challenger runs setup to generate the public parameters param and gives param to the adversary. Query 1. The adversary can issue to the challenger any playback queries on file f id j and default segment size l j of his choice. Assuming the file content M j is broken down to fill n j segments, the challenger picks a new secret key sk j (if needed in the protocol) by running KG and responds with {(s ji , TG(sk j , i, s ji )) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n j }; that is, the adversary obtains the set of all TCP segments and VSR tags for the transfer of file f id. The adversary is allowed to make nested queries of segment queries, tag access queries and proof verification queries in each playback query. Denote the set of queried file identifiers in Query 1 phase by F 1 . Challenge. Once the adversary decides that the first query phase is over, it selects a file identifier f id and a default segment size l to ask the challenger for a challenge TCP session. There is no constraint imposed on the choice of file. Denote the file content of f id by M . The challenger runs standard TCP initiation handshake with the adversary and determines TCP headers to be used. The challenger generates a new secret key sk (if needed in the protocol) and breaks down M to fill say n TCP segments. The adversary is challenged with the task of creating a correct proof for TCP segments he has not queried in the second query phase. Query 2. The adversary is allowed to make more queries to all oracles as previously done in Query 1 phase except proof verification queries on the challenged TCP session unless the reply result is 1. 5 Playback queries on the challenge f id is even allowed; note that, for playback queries, even the same file identifier (as the challenge TCP session) is requested, a different secret key and random coin will be used for the new query session (as described in the playback oracle). Denote the set of indices for O SQ and O T A queries on the challenged TCP session by I SQ and I T A respectively. Let the set of queried file identifiers f id j in Query 2 phase be F 2 . Guess. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess (I, p(I)) for some I ⊆ [1, n] such that I\I SQ = φ (where φ is the empty set). Result. The adversary wins the game if (I, p(I)) passes the verification test PV. The advantage Adv A of the adversary A is defined as the probability of winning the game.
Security against Known File Content Only Attacks (KFC-secure).
VSR security against known file content attacks is defined by the same game in Definition 1 except that no tag access (O T A ) queries can be made on the challenge TCP session in Query 2 phase. That is, I T A = φ.
Security against Tag Access Only Attacks (TA-secure).
VSR security against tag access only attacks is again defined by the same game in Definition 1 except two modifications as depicted below.
1. In the Challenge phase, the adversary has to choose a challenge f id ∈ F 1 , that is, f id has to be a new file identifier not used as input for the playback queries in the Query 1 phase. 2. In the Query 2 phase, the adversary can only make playback queries on f id j = f id where f id is the file identifier for the challenge TCP session. That is, f id ∈ F 2 .
Constructions of Verifiable Segment Receipt Protocol
Two constructions of a VSR protocol are given in this section, one based on an ideal cryptographic hash function and the other based on an aggregate authentication introduced in [7] . An ideal cryptographic hash function is one which behaves like a truly random function the output of which is unpredictable even though some bits of the input are known [12] . An aggregate authenticator assures the integrity of messages while allowing (additive) aggregation to be performed separately on messages and tags.
VSR Construction based on an Ideal Cryptographic Hash Function (VSR-H)
The VSR-H protocol is based on the scheme originally proposed by Savage et. al. [25] . In their scheme, a random number is appended to each TCP segment sent and the receiver returns the sum of these random numbers (as a proof of receipt of a chuck of TCP segments) to the sender. Since these random numbers are independently picked regardless of the content of the TCP segments, it is non-trivial to tell whether the receipt of a random number in the tag is equivalent to the receipt of the corresponding TCP segment; it is vulnerable to tag access attacks. In fact, it can be shown that the Savage's scheme is only KFC-secure but not TA-secure.
In the hash based VSR construction, we modify the Savage's scheme to ensure that the proof generated by a receiver is message-dependent using a hash function. The VSR-H protocol is both KFC-secure and TA-secure assuming the hash function behaves like a truly random function [12] . Informally, a truly random function h is a deterministic function with unpredictable outputs in the sense that, for each new input (whose output from h is yet to be evaluated), its output is indistinguishable from a randomly picked number from the range of h. Collision-resistance is also implicitly implied by the indistinguishability property. Of course, for each of the previously evaluated inputs, the same output will be obtained for all invocations of h since h is deterministic. Ideally, behaving like a truly random function is the design goal of all cryptographic hash functions.
We should emphasize that we do not make use of the random oracle model [5] in our proof of security for the VSR-H protocol. More specifically, we do not limit the number of hash invocations by the adversary as in the usual random oracle model; what limits the number of hash evaluations (on the targeted TCP session) by the adversary in our case is the number of hash inputs known to the adversary. In our case, the challenge for the adversary is that it has to find the hash output for an incomplete input (with part of the input bits unknown). Neither does our proof manipulate the adversary through the hash function.
Suppose the arithmetics is done in some finite group G where G could be any group of integers mod N (where N is an arbitrary integer not necessarily prime) or any extension fields of F 2 . Normally, only addition would be used in the VSR-H construction. When F 2 m (for some integer m) is used, an addition operation can simply be done by bitwise-XOR (exclusive OR).
The operations of the VSR-H protocol work as follows.
VSR Protocol based on an Ideal Cryptographic Hash Function (VSR-H)
Assume the file being transferred can be broken down to fill in a total of n TCP segments indexed by i.
Setup (setup):
For a security parameter λ, choose a hash function h : {0, 1} * → ZN where N has to be at least λ bits long. Let h be an ideal cryptographic hash function.
Key Generation (KG):
No secret key is needed in this protocol.
Tag Generation (TG) by S:
For each TCP segment si, 1. randomly pick a new string ri ∈ {0, 1} λ ; 2. compute xi = h(r||si) and store (i, xi) in a list Lx; 3. output ri as ti for the segment si. (si, ti) is sent to the receiver.
Proof Generation (PG) by R:
To generate a proof for the receipt of all segments with indices in I, 1. for each i ∈ I, retrieve (si, ti) and compute yi = h(ti||si); 2. compute the proof p(I) as p(I) = P i∈I yi mod N .
Proof Verification (PV) by S:
Given a proof (I, p ′ (I)), the verification is performed as follows.
1. For all i ∈ I, retrieve xi from Lx. 2. Compute the sum P = P i∈I xi mod N . The security of the VSR-H protocol is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assuming h behaves like a truly random function, the VSR-H protocol is both KFC-secure
and TA-secure.
Proof. The proofs of KFC-security and TA-security for VSR-H can be done using a similar set of arguments; we will focus on the proof of KFC-security. The proof is based on a contrapositive argument that if there exists an adversary A which can break the VSR-H protocol with non-negligible probability, an algorithm A ′ can be constructed from A to determine a correct output of h on a new input not previously evaluated on with non-negligible probability. Note that the ability to determine an output of h on a new input already breaks the indistinguishability property of h. An outline of the construction of A ′ is as follows: A ′ runs setup and gives param to A. A ′ answers all three types of queries (O P B , O SQ , O T A ) from A by randomly picking the tag r ji and the file content M j . A ′ can answer verification queries by asking its own challenger to evaluate h. Once A outputs a challenge request, A ′ randomly picks a file with content M and passes M to A. When A outputs a result (I, p(I)), A ′ randomly picks i A ′ ∈ I such that the corresponding input to h has not be previously queried to its challenger. A ′ makes h queries to determine the hashed values for all i A = i A ′ , i A ∈ I. Subtracting these hash values from p(I), A ′ can determine h(s i A ′ ||r i A ′ ) where the s i A ′ ||r i A ′ is a new input with no previous h made before.
If A is a polynomial time algorithm, so is A ′ . If A's output (I, p(I)) can pass the verification test, then the determined h(s i A ′ ||r i A ′ ) has to be a correct output of h. A ′ can determine h(s i A ′ ||r i A ′ ) correctly with non-negligibly probability if A can break the security of VSR-H with non-negligible probability.
Regarding playback queries, even for the same file content, the inputs to h for evaluation are different from session to session due to a freshly picked random tag. Note that the form of input to h for a segment s ji in session j is s ji ||r ji where r ji is freshly picked. It may be easy for an adversary to determine s ji . But given all tuples of (s ji , r ji , h(s ji ||r ji )), it is still hard to determine h(s i ||r i ) with negligible error for the challenge session with unknown r i unless the cardinality of the set {h(x||r) : ∀r ∈ {0, 1} λ } (for some known x) is not large enough. If this is the case, h is no longer collision-resistant and hence cannot be a truly random function. ♣ Practical Considerations. For the VSH-H protocol to achieve 2 80 security, λ needs to be at least 80 bits, that is, the random strings r i 's and the hash function h need to be 80-bit long. In other words, each tag or proof needs to be 80-bit long.
VSR Construction based on an Aggregate Authenticator (VSR-AA)
Our second VSR protocol is constructed based on an (additive) aggregate authenticator [7] which allows aggregation on messages and aggregation on tags. In turns, the aggregate authenticator in [7] is constructed from a pseudorandom function (PRF) [14, 13] . For an in-depth treatment of PRFs [14] , we refer to [12] . In our context, a PRF is needed to derive secret keys for different TCP segments from TCP session keys (freshly picked for each new TCP session).
Let F = {F λ } λ∈N be a PRF family where F λ = {f s : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} λ } s∈{0,1} λ is a collection of functions 6 indexed by key s ∈ {0, 1} λ . Informally, given a function f s from a PRF family with an unknown key s, any PPT distinguishing procedure allowed to get the values of f s (·) at (polynomially many) arguments of its choice should be unable to distinguish (with non-negligible advantage in λ) whether the answer of a new query is supplied by f s or randomly chosen from {0, 1} λ . The VSR-AA protocol is both KFC-secure and TA-secure if the underlying f is a pseudorandom function.
The arithmetics for the VSR-AA protocol is done in some finite field Z p where p is some large prime (at least λ-bit long). Alternatively, the extension field of Z 2 can be used; the advantage is that extension fields of Z 2 can usually result in efficient logic circuits and efficient computation procedures on most platforms.
A hash function h : {0, 1} * → Z p is used in the VSR-AA protocol. Unlike the hash function in VSR-H, the hash function used in VSR-AA is merely for the mapping purpose (mapping an arbitrary binary string to an element in Z p ) and no security requirement is thus needed. In the case the segment size is a multiple of |p| (the length of p), h can simply be implemented by breaking down the input segment into units of length |p| (each of which can be represented as an element in Z p ) and summing up all these units in Z p and treating the sum as the output of h.
The operations of the VSR-AA protocol work as follows.
VSR Protocol based on an Aggregate Authenticator (VSR-AA)
Setup (setup):
For a security parameter λ, choose a large prime p where p has to be at least λ bits long. Choose a pseudorandom function f : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} * → Zp (with key length λ). Let h : {0, 1} * → Zp be a chosen length-matching function.
Key Generation (KG) by S:
Randomly choose two keys K ∈ Z * p and K ′ ∈ Z * p . K ′ is the session key used to derive segment keys while K is used as a long term segment key.
Tag Generation (TG) by S:
For each TCP segment si with index i, 1. retrieve the session keys K, K ′ ; 2. generate a new segment key ki by computing ki = f K ′ (i); 3. compute the tag ti = K · h(si) + ki mod p; 4. (si, ti) is sent to the receiver.
Proof Generation (PG) by R:
To generate a proof for the receipt of all segments with indices in I, 1. for each i ∈ I, retrieve (si, ti); 2. compute x = P i∈I h(si) mod p; 3. compute y = P i∈I ti mod p; 4. output (x, y) as the proof p(I).
Proof Verification (PV) by S:
Given a proof (I, x ′ y ′ ), the verification is performed as follows.
Retrieve the session keys
The security of the VSR-AA is based on the difficulty in determining the actual coefficients used in an under-determined equations. More specifically, given x and y where y = K ′ + K · x for fixed, secret K and K ′ , determine the actual K and K ′ used in forming x and y. If K and K ′ are randomly picked, it can be shown that (x, y) does not give sufficient information to determine K, K ′ . For arithmetics in Z p , there are p possible 2-tuples of (k, k ′ ) which can lead to the given (x, y); only one out of p is the actual pair (K, K ′ ). Hence, for a large enough prime, there is a negligibly small probability 1/p to guess (K, K ′ ) correctly. Nevertheless, this problem can be solved with ease if an adversary breaking the VSR-AA protocol exists. The idea is as follows.
Suppose we are given a pair (x, y) and asked to determine the actual K, K ′ used. Without loss of generality, assume a single segment in the following discussion. This (x, y) can be treated as the expected receipt proof (h(s i ), t i ) for a segment-tag pair (s i , t i ) sent out to the receiver. 7 In order to lie about the receipt of a pair (s i , t i ) which is actually lost, in order to convince the sender, the receiver needs to determine a 2-tuple (x ′ , y ′ ) to fulfil the constraint equation:
where K and K ′ are unknown. Note also that the receiver has no knowledge about (x, y).
There are p possible 2-tuples of (x ′ , y ′ ) fulfilling equation (1), one of which is (x, y). Suppose the tuple (x ′ , y ′ ) fulfills equation (1) . The probability that (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x, y) is p−1 p ≈ 1 (for large p). In other words, we have two independent equations: (1) y ′ = K ′ + K · x ′ ; (2) y = K ′ + K · x to solve K and K ′ which is easy. Consequently, we can say the VSR-AA protocol is secure. A more rigorous argument is given in the proof.
The security of the VSR-AA protocol is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
Assuming f is a pseudorandom function, the VSR-AA protocol is both KFC-secure and TA-secure.
Proof. Assume the PRF has some indistinguishability property as usual. We prove by contradiction, showing that a PPT adversary which can forge a valid pair (x ′ , y ′ ) (recall that (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x, y) with probability 1/p) can also break the indistinguishability property of the underlying PRF. We show the reduction 8 in two steps: first, we show that a forging algorithm to find (x ′ , y ′ ) can be used as a subroutine to solve a newly defined problem called "Under-determined Equation Set with Pseudorandom Unknowns (UESPU)"; then we show that the UESPU problem is computationally hard if the underlying PRF has the usual indistinguishability property. The UESPU problem is defined as follows:
Under-determined Equation Set with Pseudorandom Unknowns (UESPU) Problem -Suppose K, K ′ are independent random seeds. Denote K ′ I as the sum i∈I f K ′ (i) Given a 2-tuple (x, y) where
) while allowed to evaluate the PRF at any input i ∈ I.
Solving the UESPU problem using a forger of (x ′ , y ′ ).
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can forge a valid pair (x ′ , y ′ ) to pass the VSR-AA proof verification test with probability p f . Using A as a subroutine, we can construct another algorithm A ′ to find (K, K ′ I ) from (x, y) with probability p−1 p p f in any instance of the UESPU problem. Note that A ′ should be able to answer O T A and O SQ queries from A for any i ′ ∈ I by passing the queries to its 7 Note there is no need to find si such that h(si) = x although it is possible. (si, ti) will not be sent to the receiver who tries to lie about the receipt of it. 8 The reduction of the problem of breaking the indistinguishability of the PRF to the problem of forging a valid (x ′ , y ′ ) pair to pass the verification while (x, y) is not received. own challenger. Note that A ′ can answer all O P B and O P V queries without external help. For playback queries, A ′ can simply pick new seed keys to run a new session.
The construction of A ′ is as follows: Give A the pair (x, y). When A returns a pair (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x, y), we can determine K, K ′ I from the resulting set of equations. The explanation is as follows:
So we have one equations and 2 unknowns. If (x ′ , y ′ ) is a valid forgery, then it must satisfy the following two equations (with the same K, K ′ I ) in order to pass the verification test:
The pair (x ′ , y ′ ) adds in one new, independent equation. Since (x ′ , y ′ ) = (x, y) with probability p−1 p , it can be assured that the two equations are independent with high probability for large p. Hence, there are two independent equations and two unknowns in total and it should be easy to solve for K, K ′ I (a contradiction to the UESPU assumption). The probability of solving the problem in the UESPU assumption is hence
A distinguisher for the PRF using an algorithm which solves the UESPU problem.
The UESPU problem is hard if K, K ′ I are generated by a PRF. There are one equation and two unknowns which cannot be uniquely determined. It could be shown that if there exists an algorithm A ′ solving in poly-time K and K ′ I from x and y, then the indistinguishability property of the underlying PRF is broken.
The idea is as follows: assume the seed key for generating K ′ I is unknown and the key K is known. When a challenge K ′ I is received, we have to determine whether it is randomly picked from a uniform distribution or generated by the PRF with an unknown seed key. We compute y = K ′ I + K · x to A ′ . If the solution from A ′ does not match the generated K ′ I , we reply that K ′ I is randomly picked, otherwise, it is generated from the PRF. If A ′ has non-negligible probability of breaking the UESPU assumption, the above construction would also has a non-negligible advantage of breaking the indistinguishability property of the underlying PRF. Note that all queries from A ′ could be answered by sending queries to the challenger and running the PRF with the known key. ♣ Practical Considerations. For the VSH-AA protocol to achieve 2 80 security, p and hence λ need to be at least 80 bits. That is, each tag is 80-bit long and each proof is 160-bit long.
Most provably secure PRFs such as [21] are based on the hardness of certain number-theoretic problems. However, such constructions are usually computationally expensive. Instead, key derivation in practice is often based on functions with conjectured or assumed pseudorandomness, i.e., it is inherently assumed in the construction rather than proven to follow from the hardness of a computational problem. One common example is the use of cryptographic hash functions for key derivation such as [27] . Some well-known primitives, such as HMAC [4] and OMAC [15] (conjectured PRFs), are based on assumed pseudorandomness. (HMAC assumes that the underlying compression function of the hash function in use is a PRF, while OMAC assumes the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation.)
The VSR-AA protocol in this paper does not impose a restriction on the type of underlying PRFs. The security guarantee provided by the proposed construction holds as long as the underlying PRF has the property of pseudorandomness or indistinguishability. We note that the aforementioned pseudorandomness property is also a basic requirement for the hash function used for key derivation purposes [27, 4] , e.g., in the well-known IPSec standard.
Overhead
Assume λ is the used security parameter, that is, the hash function in VSR-H is λ bits long and p in VSR-AA is also λ bits long.
Let t add and t multi denote the respective costs of performing a λ-bit addition and multiplication in Z p . Note that t add ∼ O(λ) while t multi ∼ O(λ 2 ) (See [20] Chapter 2). Let t prf denote the cost of evaluating the PRF plus the hash function in VSR-AA and t h denote the cost of evaluating the hash function in VSR-H, both with security parameter λ. Note that the cost of evaluating h in VSR-AA is negligible compared to that of evaluating the PRF. Note also that the actual computational cost of evaluating a typical cryptographic hash function in VSR-H usually depends on the size of the input string but is proportional to the output size which is the security parameter λ here.
Let S and R denote the sender and receiver respectively. Let w be the maximum window size (in number of segments) for a TCP connection. The overhead of the two VSR protocols is summarized as follows. Table 1 . Overhead of the VSR protocols (assuming |I| = w).
Both VSR-H and VSR-AA have the same overhead size for sending each TCP segment which is λ bits. For 2 80 security, it translates to a tag size of 80 bits or 10 bytes. As specified in RFC 879 [23] , the MTU (Minimum Transmission Unit) of an IP (Internet Protocol) datagram is 576 bytes. This corresponds to a minimum TCP payload size of 536 bytes (after subtracting the 20 bytes IP header and 20 bytes TCP header). As a result, the maximum communication overhead for embedding VSR tags (for both VSR-H and VSR-AA) is 10/536 ≈ 1.86%.
Defending Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The VSR-AA protocol can be modified to partially solve the man-in-the middle attacks. The variants are designed to ensure some designated entity is needed to help the receiver to generate a correct segment receipt proof. We give two variants (based on two different intuitions), the first one (VSR-AA-MAV) requiring a well-trusted network entity geographically close to the receiver to help the receiver in generating an acceptable proof whereas the second one (VSR-AA-RPK) involving the receiver's public key.
In the first variant, the trusted entity could be the gateway or firewall of the local domain wherein the receiver is attached to. We call this trusted network entity the middle-address-verifier as its task is to assure that the receiver is really at the network address it claims. The sender shares a secret session key K G with the gateway which needs to do some processing on the VSR tags to allow the generation of segment receipt proof acceptable by the sender. The processing is seamless to the receiver which only needs to follow the VSR-AA protocol.
In the second variant, the public key of the receiver is needed in the VSR tag generation by the sender. The receiver needs to use its private key to generate a correct proof acceptable by the sender. We intend to include the private key operation in the processing of each segment at the receiver to be certain that the only way a malicious receiver can gain through installed agents close to the sender is to give out its private key to the agents. For the receiver, launching such a man-in-the middle attack could be risky as once his installed agents are detected and compromised, his own private key will be revealed or made public. Of course, we assume there is some binding between network addresses and public keys.
VSR-AA Protocol with Middle Address Verifier (VSR-AA-MAV)
VSR-AA Protocol with a Private Key Middle-Address-Verifier Assume the file being transferred can be broken down to fill in a total of n TCP segments indexed by i.
Setup (setup):
For a security parameter λ, choose a large prime p where p has to be at least λ bits long. Choose a pseudorandom function f : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} * → Zp. Let h : {0, 1} * → Zp be a chosen length-matching function.
Key Generation (KG):
Randomly choose two keys K ∈ Z
